Monday, August 23, 2010

Reassessing the Central Arguments: An Evolution in UN Peacekeeping?


The conclusions to my central arguments against or for the emergence of a cosmopolitan conception of human worth in a post-WWII international system have several weaknesses and challenges. I concluded that the international system has moved progressively towards universal legalism, yet I asserted that regardless of these changes, the DRC case cannot support the ongoing efforts of the UN to unify states towards an enforceable human rights regime. Additionally, my argument limited its focus to domestic turbulence in the DRC to explain the condition of the international system. Domestic relations cannot necessarily provide an explanation for the entire international system. It is necessary then to provide a cross-cutting analysis to redeem the aforementioned research from its circular assumptions.

One aspect of my thesis evaluated MONUC’s peacekeeping mission to offer a more realistic analysis of the UN’s ability to defend the human rights regime and thus, I concluded that UN peacekeeping is a defunct agency in global society. However, such a conclusion based on one of many UN missions cannot possibly provide an overarching explanation of the modern international system as it disregards any possible presentation of other UN missions and therefore, it cannot be tested adequately. Thus, the following text will focus on UN peacekeeping in two different cases: UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) from 1992 to 1994 with special emphasis on the US’ role, and the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 1993 to the months following the genocide. These UN missions will be compared with the current and largest UN mission in the world, MONUC. These analyses aim to be short and concise, conveying important information on their original mandate and future mandates.

Cosmopolitanism and realism, as stated previously, are contending conceptions in international relations theory. By examining previous peacekeeping cases, I will attempt to offer a more solid and conclusive conception of the international community. When it comes to cosmopolitanism and its substantiation, on a smaller level, it can be seen from any UN peacekeeping operation given the nature of such missions: to provide universal equality regardless of nationality, and to secure international peace as well as security and the rights of those individuals regardless of national interest gains.


Realism would contend that UN peacekeeping is a defunct and overly idealistic system that can only be achieved if states feel a national interest is present and attainable. Therefore, I am presenting two cases in UN peacekeeping, along with the critical information provided by MONUC’s operations, to give a less circular reasoning in my analysis. Evidence of each view will be presented in each case to support such claims. Importantly, the history of peacekeeping has demonstrated several missions that have either been deemed a failure or a success, depending largely on the willingness of the international community to contribute to these missions.

Additionally, peacekeeping is challenged by the improbability of having universal implementation methods as cases differ do to culture and geography. The first UN peacekeeping mission was the United Nations Emergency Force – I (UNEF I), in response to Israeli, French, and British hostilities on the Egyptian border.109 At this point in time, peacekeeping was limited in its military capabilities, and the peacekeeping mission was strictly neutral, and non-coercive.110 Yet, these methods have proven complicated and often impossible during the many intrastate wars of the 1990s. Therefore, the following cases may provide a better understanding of the evolution of peacekeeping and further explain the contention between cosmopolitanism and realism.

Somalia: One of Many in a New World Order


It is no question that all UN peacekeeping operations responded to severe and devastating humanitarian strife, collateral damage, and relentless warring factions aimed at securing power over the state. Somalia was no exception as the civil war that began in 1991 killed an estimated 50,000 “non-combatants” and destroyed any remnants of a functioning society.111 The original mandate lacked sufficient stipulations to aid an increasingly volatile situation, mostly based off reports from the Secretary General. The mandate was concise and persistent in its calls for an international humanitarian response.

It called for increased airlift operations to deliver humanitarian aid to an isolated Mogadishu. Additionally, it established four zonal headquarters for the operation, urged logistical support and reiterated the need for an international recognition of the humanitarian situation.112 Eventually, after several humanitarian aid efforts on behalf of the US (Operation Provide Relief, which airlifted 28,000 tons of aid) and other states, UN peacekeeping took a coercive shift in the approval of Security Council Resolution 794 in December 2003, and granted the deployment of all necessary means to establish security and humanitarian relief operations.113 The US created and led the United Task Force (UNITAF), which was supported by nearly 28,000 American troops and 10,000 from other states.114

Although Operation Restore Hope was a wake-up call to uneasy Americans that had witnessed a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu after the infamous Black Hawk Down incident, the mission itself was successful. Robert DiPrizio wrote that the operation commanded five months and achieved all of the four phases laid out (the fourth stage being the handover of operations to the UN) and the UNITAF’s casualties were low, at 27 total (18 Americans). The mission’s success prompted the UN to strengthen the original mandate to ensure that a recurrence of violence did not happen. Nonetheless, given the Somalia case, it is clear that a militarily robust UN mission, although paradoxical, can achieve quick results.

UN peacekeeping operations had progressed substantially in the post-Cold War international system, yet with the remaining decade ahead, more tests of the capacity of UN peacekeeping to end violence would arise and question the effectiveness of its operation. Notwithstanding, it was apparent that US intervention was necessary and what is the perfect example of cosmopolitan ethics. However, the realism existed in the withdrawal of most US troops after the Black Hawk Down incident, which may have been a product of US domestic reaction to the 18 American lives lost in the battle. Despite the fact that hundreds of Somalis died in the fighting, and several more innocent lives had already been lost before and during the UN’s mission, the United states ended its support after recognizing the mission was a failure and also to appease US Congressional backlash at the mission. Sadly, this abstention would continue through the 1990s, even in the face of genocide.

The Genocide in Rwanda: Back to Square One

The Rwanda case reveals a troubling and dark period in post-WWII history. The reuse of genocide as a form of war was something the UN was created to prevent. However, UNAMIR witnessed the worst nonintervention in the international community, stemming directly from great power abstention and appeals to withdraw the UN mission in Rwanda. UNAMIR’s mandate was severely inefficient before the genocide. The mandate was first meant to facilitate the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement between the rebel Tutsi and Hutus, to monitor the ceasefire between the warring parties, and to assist in humanitarian aid.115 In April 1994, the Security Council passed a resolution to give the mission intermediary power and continue aid efforts that had been cut off as the genocide was underway.

Essentially, the mandate emulated the weak peacekeeping methods evident during the UNEF I operation, and had no semblance of a robust mandate as seen in the Somali case. Samantha Power notes that US “intelligence analysts were keenly aware of Rwanda’s history and the possibility that atrocity would occur [and]... a CIA study found that some four million tons of small arms had been transferred from Poland to Rwanda, via Belgium,” clearly as tools for the genocide.116 The warning signs were there, but what kept the United States from intervening on a scale witnessed in Somalia? Furthermore, why did the United States and other Security Council members deny UNAMIR more troops and instead reduced it from almost 5,000 before the genocide to nearly 300 during the genocide?

During the genocide, in which the Hutu majority was butchering the “cockroach” Tutsi minority, UN officials reported that within days of its start, 50,000 Tutsis had been butchered in the streets, churches, schools and government agencies, and within a few months, nearly 800,000 were dead.117 As stated before, Rwanda witnessed the worst in the international community, the United Nations and the free world. US and UN bureaucracy cost nearly one million lives. What does this mean for cosmopolitan ethics and realism? Firstly, US abstention from intervention in Rwanda may stem from the negative political impact of the 18 dead US troops in Somalia. It would appear that although the US expressed humanitarianism during the Somalia case and basked in its superpower leadership in the ‘New World Order,’ political backlash during the Somalia case caused the United States to rethink its foreign policy in humanitarian interventions. UN peacekeeping could not enjoy the willingness of states to stop violence as seen in Somalia, and state interests would once more impede on progress in the human rights regime.

Conclusions:

What do these two cases in UN peacekeeping mean for MONUC? MONUC at first was a substantially week mission, severely undermined by the Secretary-General at the time and the mandate took years to reach an adequate level. Although MONUC still lacks enforcement power, UN forces have been aiding the transitional government in purging the DRC of rebel factions crossing national borders to pillage resources, rape women, destroy villages, and steal children to enhance their campaigns.

The UN Security Council has never failed the DRC because it has persistently adapted the several issues hampering the mandates proper implementation and the success of the transitional government. However, it is not the actions of the UN that should be condoned, but rather, the lack of timing in passing and implementing these changes. It is no mistake that the majority of people, regardless of nationality, do not know of how severe the situation in the DRC has been for more than 10 years. Yet, realistically, amidst the emergence of coercive peacekeeping in the Somalia case or “armed humanitarians” according to Robert DiPrizio, and what was later seen in Kosovo, there has been a positive cosmopolitan movement in peacekeeping.

The phenomenon of UN peacekeeping, as evidenced by Somalia, Rwanda and the DRC, has had several weaknesses. Rwanda was a failure and the genocide occurred because there was an international community of the unwilling, yet when willing international actors are involved, most importantly the United States, UN peacekeeping is at its strongest and missions are more likely to succeed. The DRC case is interesting because although it receives more than $1 billion in international aid and the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world, the darkness of the situation there is the absence of international awareness.

Nonetheless, the DRC case, although a failure in many respects, substantiates a cosmopolitan shift in international politics because it utilized the evolutionary peacekeeping seen in Somalia i.e. a shift in mandate strength. The human rights regime has provided a viable alternative to collective security, which was mostly a failure in the League of Nations system. The darkness does not lie in the international community as a whole, but within abstention from intervention. The DRC is the beneficiary of US efforts (AFRICOM), UN efforts, and efforts by international organizations, but not of a wide-scale military operation as seen in Somalia. I will say lastly that the darkness lies also in ignorance, a contagious reality for the DRC.

Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Into the Heart of Darkness: Conceptualizing the International Community, the United Nations, and Power Politics in the Democratic Republic of Congo


Introduction

It was 42 years before the end of World War II that Joseph Conrad wrote his infamous novel “Heart of Darkness,” yet today its relevance to the Congo remains starkly the same, as the aegis of colonialism has left a nearly impenetrable footprint. The novel explores the hypocrisy of Belgium’s imperialism as the act of civilizing the African became quite uncivil. The imperial incivility, political factionalization, and decades of authoritarian rule and war have led the United Nations (UN) to enter the Congo, quite like Marlow’s travel up the Congo River. Yet, amidst the chaos of Belgium’s enterprise and the aftermath of World War II, the Congo offers a troubling and difficult case for international relations theory. This paper aims at pondering this case to hopefully shed light into the heart of darkness and give an explanation for ‘the horror’ that Kurtz only realized at his final moment.

Following World War II, it was abundantly clear through international consensus that the urgency for preventive action against another world war required the reorganization and formation of the failed League of Nations system. The former colonial and imperial powers of Europe were decimated and the United States and Russia stood as victors against an impetuous regime. The global order was changing rapidly with the creation of the atomic bomb and the rise of the United States and Russia as superpowers. With a potent collective memory, the post-World War II era ushered in the establishment of international law and human rights doctrines under the auspices of regional and international organizations, in large part as a result of the UN Charter. On April 25, 1945, the Charter of the United Nations (UN) was finalized under the Westphalian principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peace and security amongst nations. The Charter outlined principles for peace and prosperity, collective security, and the fundamental importance of the individual. Consequently, a new global order emerged aimed for deterring future wars and creating a council of peaceful discourse amongst states. It is important to note that this emergence shifted the international system from a Westphalian state-centrism to a UN based idealism that granted the individual sovereignty and autonomy within their respective state, as well as in a newly formed international “community.” Although some basic tenets of the Treaty of Westphalia continued, i.e. state sovereignty and the right to wage war, this UN idealism assumed the common interests of the member states and embarked on massive efforts of international cooperation, conflict resolution and peacekeeping.


Peacekeeping, a direct example of UN ambition and its idealism is not once mentioned in the UN Charter; however, the newly formed UN system began a campaign of peacekeeping throughout the 1950’s to the present day. In the post-Cold War era, it is hard to imagine that such peace and prosperity has continued in this international “community” given the reuse of genocide as a form of war in the 1990’s. Most astounding is the silence in the international media and the ignorance of the global North to the political breakdown of 10 central African states that resulted in a continental war in 1998. At the middle of this conflict lies the ‘heart of darkness’ so pervasive that the very foundations of human civility and decency are challenged.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has suffered from nearly 70 years of colonial rule and exploitation and several decades of authoritarian dictatorship. Since 1998, an estimated 5.4 – 7.8 million Congolese people have lost their lives due to the conflict, the most since World War II. As expected, the UN Security Council voted to initiate a UN mission to the Congo after passing UN Resolution 1304(2000). The emergence of the United Nations Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has attempted to institutionalize normative democratic principles and subsequent international law within the government and society. MONUC is currently the largest UN mission in the world consisting of nearly 20 thousand military personnel. Dissecting the structural bureaucratic workings of MONUC and other international efforts will provide a basis understanding the current situation on a domestic level.

At the center of most African politics is the arbitrary nature of the state as a result of European colonialism. This arbitration is a cause for much of the violence throughout the continent as most conflicts surrounding the DRC have rebuked state boundaries and repeatedly violated the concept of national sovereignty as granted by international law. This paper aims at describing the flaws in the theory of liberal institutionalism in reference to central Africa. The nation has failed, the state has failed, and therefore the ability of international institutions to build a strong liberal form of government in the DRC is a challenging feat.


There exists a multipolar domestic political system in the DRC, owing to the hundreds of tribal and ethnic affiliations. To assume a national identity and embody a ‘Congolese’ affinity is a first major step to unifying the state. Without this element, the DRC can neither exist as a nation nor act as a state in the international community. This assumption draws on a very Western plain of thought and does not take into account the intransigent nature of African polities, i.e. the complex hierarchical systems of tribal unity that already exists. However, given the norms that persist within the international community ideal, Congolese affinity is an important element in taking control of the government and allocating the resources towards pragmatic means of distribution. Amidst the deep-rooted historical connections and ethnocentrisms in the DRC, this element separates the Congolese from the international community ideal. The development of effective due process of law and jurisprudential discourse in a workable justice system in the DRC relies heavily on a continental acceptance of such norms, but most importantly, a strong willingness of the international community under the resources of the UN and the great powers to bring peace to millions of Congolese, central Africa, and the continent itself.

It is most important for this paper to distinguish between the United Nations and the idea of the international community, as the former stems from the latter. The United Nations is an international organization of nation-states aimed at engaging in meaningful discourse to achieve international peace and security, but also it is a means for states to define their national interests and engage in conflict resolution. The UN is a physical body where international law and human rights manifest. The term ‘international community’ is a concept stemming from and supported by the UN system and its concept assumes the common interests of member states, i.e. states share common goals of international cooperation and peace often through collective measures. However, the term is more difficult to define as international relations scholars debate its very existence. Therefore, what is the international community in reference to the DRC? There are many views on the ‘international community;’ however, this paper will focus on two divergent views to establish a theoretical framework of approach in order to answer the questions, does the international community exist given the example of the DRC? And if so, what is the true state of this international community? The views are as such, one in support and one against the existence of an international community and provide a theoretical framework for this paper:

1. Kofi Annan in his essay titled “Problems Without Passports,” describes the international community as many multicultural and homogeneous states that share a common vision of a better world. There is a realization of the common human struggle and therefore, states seek to work together collectively and through the UN to solve these struggles. No country or person lives in isolation as the interdependence of state economies and the expansion of globalization binds states together. The international community is an entity with an address and a developing conscious. Annan notes that the international community is one that allows half of humanity to exist on $2 or less a day, yet during times of disaster pledges millions in foreign aid. Therefore, the international community according to Annan is an institutional entity with peaceful intentions and a shared vision of cooperation.

In international relations theory, Annan’s essay best fits with liberal institutionalism and constructivism (idealism) as it stresses the importance of institutions in bringing global order, but it also presupposes the inherent interest of states as global peace seekers and not power maximizers in a system of anarchy.

2. Ruth Wedgwood in her essay “Gallant Delusions,” believes the international community is a naive term and a moral hazard as its “diffusion of responsibility excuses countries that have no intention of lending a hand.” As examples, Wedgwood presents Bosnia, Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge regime, and East Timor as the international response often occurred after much bureaucratic delineation and the damage had already promulgated. In essence, the international community is lawless and with no “cannon fire” to its goals for peace and prosperity amongst states. Wedgwood finally argues that it is only states that can protect “a threatened population from genocide,” ethnic militia’s, and cross-border attacks.

In international relations, Wedgwood’s view draws on many different areas of theory as she supports the existence of international institutions, given their abilities to “write treaties,” evaluate human rights abuses and deliver assistance in natural disasters and humanitarian crises; however, Wedgwood also explicitly acknowledges the realities of international power politics. Institutions cannot deliver the hard power needed to bring down genocidaires and authoritarian regimes guilty of crimes against humanity. (Is she a neorealist?) Therefore, the international community does not exist and is an idyllic conceptualization.


Essentially, this paper aims at examining the DRC in terms of humanitarian plight, the current UN mission, MONUC, and the willingness of states in the international system to contribute to the most destructive war since WWII. Based on the evidence of the DRC, what view is most consistent, if any? The political breakdown of central Africa and the continued humanitarian plight and political strife in the DRC offers a troubling but necessary case in international relations as it challenges the efforts of the UN system and the concept of an international community following the end of World War II. The DRC’s colonial experience and post-World War II independence have been tumultuous events that have left millions dead. By examining the aforementioned ideas and their subsequent theories, is the international community a correct term, and where is the DRC in this community? Is this community only limited to the developed states of the global North? This paper aims to examine not only the domestic affairs of the DRC through the actions of MONUC, but also to investigate and understand what truly lies at the heart of darkness, and what can the UN and the supposed international community do about it.

Wednesday, November 4, 2009

Thoughts on My Time in Geneva, Switzerland


United Airlines Flight 9
74 finally landed amidst an uncontrollable excitement and anticipation boiling inside me. I was overwhelmed with a sense of pride and accomplishment in knowing that my own decisions and planning brought me to Geneva, a small city of great international importance. Yet under this pride manifested a preconceived understanding of Swiss life and culture that I had not yet noticed or understood, it was hidden deep within a manifestation of cultural prejudice engrained in American society. Stepping off the plane was like walking through a veil, an invisible ‘iron curtain’ of my making, an ideological and cultural warfare of which I was completely unaware. I walked to customs, flashed my passport with ephemeral pride and confidently strode to the unknown tram stop that I prayed existed. I was on a mission and nothing could ruin my pomp, not even my lack of French, or so I thought.

I had prepared a list of French phrases I felt would suffice for my
incomprehension of the language and my ill-mannered expectation that Swiss people knew English and that they knew it quite well. It was much to my surprise then in asking people in passing for any sense of direction that they were either not Swiss or they didn’t speak any English. Quickly, the chisels of reality, and an enormous sense of place hammered the veil that I had built up. I realized the seriousness of my assumptions and what they meant for my experiences in Switzerland. To not know the language is to instantly separate oneself from the superfluous cultural understandings present, and it is in this separation that stereotypes strengthen themselves. I was glad to have learned this early in my travels of Geneva and Switzerland. I learned that Swiss people respect their language and expect acknowledgement of their language from foreigners in return. I tackled the language barrier and I have now learned a good understanding of basic French. In essence, I changed myself to better assimilate to the culture of Geneva, but more importantly, I began to tear down the veil myself.

I struggle with the language barrier every day, but with the confidence of knowing that I am learning far more than when I endorsed my ignorant assumptions. Nonetheless, my judgments of Swiss life and culture continued. I found myself quenching an undying curiosity of Swiss people by ‘people-watching’ whenever possible. This habit became a basis for my prejudice against the Swiss and often led me to disappointing conclusions. On a Saturday afternoon, I decided to reflect on my experiences thus far in Geneva, jump on a random tram, and open a book, voluntarily unknowing of my destination. To add to this, I was listening to Fantasia on a Theme: Symphony Number 5 by Ralph Vaughan Williams, as it is my favorite classical piece.

I remember in this moment thinking of Geneva as a whited sepulcher - as Joseph Conrad noted in reference to Belgium in his novel Heart of Darkness – a city of beauty and glamour on the outside, but rotting from within. As the song progressed, I felt this designation was justified. The responsibility for this assumption came from my observations of people in the city, and not from a personal vendetta against the Swiss people. I noticed the people parade what they wear, how they look, and what they own. There was a superficial and arrogant vibe that tore down my confidence and diluted the happiness I once had stepping off Flight 974. I felt demeaned by the population as my lack of money and nice clothes separated me from the glamorous lifestyle abundantly present within the city. I found myself at a crossroads, not understanding why I came to such a place and why I poured good money into a whited sepulcher, a rotting city.

Fantasia on a Theme played through and finished beautifully as I stepped off the tram into an unknown area. I was thankful for Ralph Vaughan Williams and his wonderful work in classical music. Nonetheless, I stumbled upon a stream that led across the French border and towards the towering Le Salève mountains where I sat down and reflected. An epiphany overwhelmed me with excitement as I realized a major flaw in all my assessments. The veil I had worked tirelessly to tear down was as prevalent as when I stepped off the plane, only this time I was aware of it completely. My judgments were flawed for one reason; they disregarded the common nature of the human condition of love and kindness. Geneva is as much rotting as any city in the world, but where there is rotting there is life. In that moment, I tore down the veil completely and felt relief and excitement for where I was. I was flawed, yet sometimes it takes rock bottom for one to realize all the good. I digress.

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Honors Research: The Democratic Republic of the Congo:

The United Nations, Power Politics and the Restructuring of the Democratic Republic of the Congo:


The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), located in the heart of Africa and virtually landlocked by nine surrounding countries, has suffered from several decades of authoritarian dictatorship, most notably under President Mobuto’s government. Since 1998, an estimated 5.4 million Congolese have lost their lives due to conflict, the most since World War II. Consequently, the emergence of the United Nations Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) has attempted to institutionalize normative democratic principles and subsequent international law within the government and the society. Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri note excellently that attempting to execute universal norms of justice “in the absence of political and institutional preconditions risks weakening norms of justice and revealing their ineffectiveness.”[1] Their argument recognizes the social and political fragility international organizations are faced with in restructuring the DRC. MONUC is currently the largest United Nations mission in the world consisting of nearly 20 thousand military personnel.

The arbitrary borders of the surrounding states since European colonialism have been a cause for much of the violence throughout the continent. The countless surrounding conflicts are engrained in ethnic and political tensions complicating the many international efforts for reconciliation. These conflicts have rebuked state boundaries and violated the concept of national sovereignty that the DRC presupposes. Furthermore, why is it that the DRC, one of the most pivotal natural resource providers in the world, remains in humanitarian decay almost 15 years after the collapse of its authoritarian state and amidst the involvement of nearly 150 international organizations?

My research will analyze the involvement of international organizations in developing a legal structure for justice, democracy, institutionalization and infrastructure building. Dissecting the structural bureaucratic workings of MONUC and the emanations involved provides an effective and solid discourse for understanding the continued humanitarian plight and illegal exploitation of mineral resources. I will examine the effects of power politics and the mineral resources entering international economic markets. Additionally, MONUC has little enforcement power amidst a vast international market of willing buyers. I am proposing that a stronger international effort to promote universal legal norms is necessary for the government to monitor resource extraction, therefore, reducing the black market and available funds to rebel factions.

The significance of this inquiry is engrained in the humanitarian cost of inaction from powerful democratic nation states and the abundance of high-demand natural resources present in the DRC. The development of effective due process of law and jurisprudential discourse in a workable justice system in the DRC relies heavily on societal acceptance of such norms. Additionally, the aforementioned relates to arguments in transitional justice, power politics and international organizations, which are investigated extensively by political scientists. My research hopes to portray the pervasive issues in the DRC while addressing fundamental problems in the pursuit for human dignity, due process of law, and human standards of living in central Africa.


[1] Jack Snyder, Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2003/04): 6.

Sunday, January 11, 2009

The World is in Chaos

I recognize that there will never be world peace, an end to egregious acts of genocide, nor an end to human suffering. Although, this may be a dispirited reasoning of the international system, it is irrevocably a disheartening truth. My devoted study of international relations at The Ohio State University is not an act of redemption from this reality, but will allow for me to attain an informed responsibility to prevent human suffering where possible. I pursue this life ambition in hopes of alleviating the countless innocent lives plagued by world disparities, but more importantly, to give a voice to the guiltless victims quieted by fictitious leaders, and unsympathetic regimes.

The one mission in my life is to see, witness and feel what is truly happening in the world, in efforts to diminish ignorance and reveal greater truth. This earnest desire “to know” is an awesome privilege bestowed upon humankind, and furthermore should be honed by every individual. Such transcendence from igno
rance would change the world tenfold, for knowing, understanding, and acting is the only way to enforce effective global diplomacy. There have been many whose lives were cut short, and whose dreams and passions completely taken away, and it is this reason I devote myself to international relations, because empowerment of the mind is empowerment to change.

The global condition is dire,
and the demand for constituents with an international knowledge is surpassing with the increase in state, intrastate, and ethnic conflicts. I have come to an overpowering and absolute resolve that because so many lives have been cut short by such conflicts, I will devote my life to understanding, rationalizing, and furthermore, preventing such occurrences. I am an idealist only because of my persistent hope for humanity. Whether it is war or poverty, I have come to realize that having life and an infinite grasp of knowledge is more powerful than any diplomatic decision. I want to understand why people continue to die at the hands of governments, which are human establishments intended to promote civil society and utopia. Moreover, humans are flawed, and therefore our governments fail us and the global condition continues in pandemonium.

In conclusion, studying international relations has brought more resolve to the question of life, and has opened new opportunities for change. Life is an adagio, a slow crescendo of impediments and fortitudes leading to a climax and resolve. Even so, life is not a teleology with indefinites, nor can it be explained with complete understanding. We continue as a human race to plant the seeds of chaos into later generations without reasoning. Therefore, we are faced with insurmountable issues in the international system. We fell from grace, and therefore, must live in chaos, separate from a divine intervention, and forced to reason with a world in turmoil. I believe my study of international relations gives a voice and mind to the silent innocence of chaos.

Saturday, December 20, 2008

Preventive Action and the United Nations



The United Nations (UN) is an organization that operates under a complex international system based on sovereignty and territorial integrity. Consequently, establishing a world order without violating those international norms poses many difficulties for the UN. However, the responsibility of the UN to maintain peace through preventive action in the international system underlies an extensive partnership with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), regional organizations, such as the European Union and the African Union, and nation-states. Gareth Evans quotes in the chapter “Preventive Action and Conflict Resolution” in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century that “While there will continue to be a major, and growing, role for regional organizations…overwhelmingly the major responsibility for doing better [at preventive action] is going to have to be borne by the UN…” (87).


The UN has established itself as the center for conflict resolution, preventive action, and peacekeeping, which means the responsibility of regional organizations and NGOs in the area of preventive action must draw on the norms of the UN. When looking at the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), it is clear that, even though the UN takes major responsibility for establishing peace, the willingness of regional organizations and NGOs contributes greatly to this continued peace. However, the cohesive action seen with the regional organizations and NGOs is partly due to their adherence to UN regulations and guidelines. Consequently, the UN is the core organization for preventive action and peacekeeping in the international system, and therefore, it is responsible for improving peacekeeping methods thereafter.


The failure of collective security after WWI and the horrors experienced thereafter in WWII demonstrated the need for a core organization built on adherence to the protection of sovereignty and human rights. John Roper states the end of the Cold War “…has brought about a renaissance of the multilateral imperative, the desire to find multilateral solutions to problems of international relations and security” (Roper 255). The UN attributes itself as a non-coercive, neutral organization with limited military capability and a strong interposition force (Lecture 4). Nonetheless, since its establishment in 1945, the UN has been faced with many changes in the international system, most notably the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), causing the formation of a Unipolar international system.


This transcendence, with the atrocities of Bosnia/Herzegovina and Rwanda in the 1990s, has questioned the validity and effectiveness of the UN as a peacekeeping organization. However, the increasing importance of regional organizations and NGO’s and their willingness to step into conflicts has allowed the UN to overcome the many complex issues in the new international system. Evans notes that inevitably “Disputes themselves will continue to arise… and… they will do so with greater frequency and in more complex formulations, as the recent rapid growth of intrastate disputes suggests” (Evans 61). The change that came with the emergence of a Unipolar international system created an undesirable need for third-world states by the superpowers, since territorial claims and proxy wars meant little to the United States and Russia at the Cold War’s end.

In order to tackle this pervasive issue, the UN needs to commission a high volume of analytical study of major regions of the world where conflicts are prone to arise. The studies must focus on the geopolitical, ethnic, economic, and anthropological aspects of the state, while focusing on the possible UN strategies to addressing the problems. By understanding the reasons for violence and conflict, the UN can develop strategies addressing the specific issues and conflicts and can profligate a more rapid and efficient response.

Typically, the Secretary-General does not analyze a specific conflict until violence has reached impermissible levels and a peace-agreement has been brokered. This approach puts a time constraint on possible preventive action, which inadvertently limits the possibility of a strong and respectable peacekeeping force. Consequently, the security on the ground may be compromised, which Steven Stedman notes in Ending Civil Wars “…there cannot be…the holding of elections, reempowerment of civil society, establishment of political accountability, and redevelopment of the economy; many areas in which the UN must focus their analytical studies (Stedman 141). The abovementioned is an improvement that must be taken by the UN regardless of the economic cost to the organization because ultimately in doing so, the UN may be able to allocate resources more efficiently.

The need for improvement in preventive action from the UN increases as conflicts continue to arise throughout the world, most notably in Africa where conflicts in Central and West Africa continue to destabilize the region. The UN has to continue to adapt to changes in the international system and the conflicts that arise therein. The presence of spoilers in conflicts, and the complexities with curbing violence in a collapsed state have exacerbated the UN in the area of preventive action; however, regional organizations and NGOs have provided much support in these areas. NGOs in Liberia have been able to focus in areas such as education, health, safety, and the rebuilding of decimated villages, thus the possibilities of a stable and economically sustainable society increase.

Regional organizations such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) can provide numerous troops to the conflict area, help with logistics support for peacekeeping forces, and aid infrastructure building. The UN must take advantage of the many possibilities for effective deployment, as well as the collective action of states contributing to peacekeeping operations. However, the UN must also stay clear of relying heavily on outside organizations to provide this support. By making the many necessary improvements, the UN can provide a central guideline to outside organizations to substantiate the preventive action process. Fundamentally, it is through the UN that progress and improvement must be made, mostly for the reason that the UN is the center for conflict resolution after conflicts have not been resolved, and peacekeeping is commissioned. Evans notes that “…in a great many cases, disputes both can and should be satisfactorily managed and resolved without recourse to the UN, through cooperation at the bilateral, subregional, or regional level” (Evans 71).

UNMIL operations have sustained peace in Liberia since August 2003, and have been able to allow for the free election of President Sir-Leaf Johnson in 2005 (Security Council (2008) 11). Evans’ concluding quote in the instance of UNMIL operations is substantial given that ECOWAS was unable to sustain the subsequent peace agreement between the rival factions and the Liberian government. In this instance, the regional organization ECOWAS was unable to maintain peace in Liberia because of the complexity of the issues involved. The UN operates on a much higher international level than regional organizations and NGOs, and therefore, has a much greater base to support preventive action and peacekeeping operations. The operational capacity of ECOWAS forces in Liberia prior to UNMIL deployment was limited to urban regions, making smaller villages and areas more prone to corruption and violence. However, after UNMIL deployed its international peacekeeping force to the region, the smaller rural areas were subsequently protected by peacekeeping forces. The UN was able to establish funding from the international community and from financial organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

In conclusion, because the UN is the core organization for preventive action and peacekeeping, the responsibility for improving preventive action is an imperative. Evans’ quote merely attests to the immense responsibility that the UN has to the international community, and that by relying to heavily on regional organizations the UN hinders the possibility for correction within itself. By focusing on correction within the UN, preventive action may have a more firm effect in conflict-ridden areas, which may lead to a deterrence of violence. By commissioning a plethora of analytical studies of conflict regions and regions prone to conflict, the UN may be able to provide a more effective strategy to preventive action and peacekeeping implementation. This will help regional organizations to deter violence and conflict prior to UN operations, and will make preventive action more sustainable. The UN must also continue to adapt to the changes in the international system before problems arise that may deplete the UN’s respectability across the world. Furthermore, Evans’ conclusive quote makes an incisive point that preventive action must ultimately be honed and improved by the UN in order for peacekeeping to continue unabated

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

The United Nations Mission in Liberia: A Case Study

By Christopher Schmidt
Pages 1-4 of 12

The need for United Nations peacekeeping operations in Liberia came after several years of ethnic and political violence antagonized by President Samuel Doe’s government in the 1980s. The provocation of a failed 1985 coup attempt derives from Doe’s blatant agenda of ethnic exploitation, which limited most ethnic groups from government auspices. Subsequently, after several years of pervasive corruption and the slaughter of ethnic groups, the political state of Liberia led to social turbulence within these many ethnic factions. The eventual formation of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by American Liberian Charles Taylor, sought an anti-governmental agenda that set off the 1989-1997 civil war (Adebajo 601). With a civil war underway, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took an essential step by forming the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 (“UNMIL-Background”). ECOWAS was an essential organization during the beginning of the civil war, and well up to the 2003 deployment of UNMIL operations, because of their many programs aimed at solving the Liberian crisis. In 1993, the United Nations Security Council stepped into the conflict by establishing the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) (“UNMIL-Background”). UNOMIL completed its undertaking of aiding an eventual peace agreement on August 2, 1997, when the nation democratically elected Charles Taylor president under the new government establishment (“UNMIL-Background”).

With UNOMIL’s mandate complete, the UN established the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) in November 1997, aimed primarily at facilitating national reconciliation after the multiparty elections (Annan 1). Importantly, UNOL was backed by the Security Council, the United Nations country team, and well-known civil society organizations (Annan 1). Additionally, in the midst of UNOL’s peace-building efforts, the hindrance of their intended operations began with conflicts arising in government and political opposition parties. Two important rebel groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) emerged between 1999 and 2002 and aimed to overthrow President Taylor’s government, (Annan 2). In September 2002, the International Contact Group on Liberia was created in New York under the co-chairmanship of ECOWAS and the European Union in order to involve the international community (Annan 2). Subsequently, the Security Council pushed for the development of a strategy to address the problems in Liberia, and the threat it posed to international and regional peace and security (Annan 2).

After intense regional and international pressure, ECOWAS initiated peace talks on June 4, 2003 in Accra, Ghana, with the support of representatives of the United Nations, the African Union, the United States and the International Contact Group (Annan 3). Consequently, a ceasefire agreement was signed on June 17, 2003; however, LURD forces forcefully entered Monrovia and broke the peace agreement. In August 2003, President Taylor officially handed over power to Vice-President Moses Blah, and peace talks in Accra between the two rebel parties began. With the help of representatives from international and regional entities, the peace negotiations eventually led to an agreement. This agreement stipulated the end to the war and the creation of the National Transitional Government of Liberia. The two rebel parties requested under the peace agreement, and in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, that the United Nations deploy a force to Liberia to help support the National Transitional Government (Annan 4). Following international pressure, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1497 on August 1, 2003, allowing the establishment of a multinational force and a United Nations stabilization force in Liberia. After further United Nations evaluation of the situation, the adoption of Resolution 1509 on September 19, 2003 created the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (Annan 16). Additionally, under request of the Secretary-General, UNOL was to terminate its offices and transfer its functions to UNMIL (Resolution 1509 (2003) 2).

The mandate, likewise, addresses a multitude of humanitarian, military, and financial issues, as well as the implementation of various agreements between the rival parties (“UNMIL-Mandate”). More importantly, the mandate demands the “support for implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the protection of UN staff, facilities and civilians, the support for humanitarian and human rights assistance, the support for security reform, and the support for implementation of the peace process” (“UNMIL-Mandate”).” The aforementioned covers a comprehensive strategy of how to address the many issues in Liberia while clarifying the intentions of UNMIL and all international entities involved. Additionally, while considering the history of the conflict, and the problems involved therein, the mandate explains the necessity for humanitarian and human rights assistance, and infrastructure building. For example, the mandate states UNMIL’s responsibility to “help establish the necessary security conditions for humanitarian assistance…to assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia…” (“UNMIL-Mandate”). This demonstrates the mandates intention for protecting the humanitarian aid going through Liberia, which will help control the growing human rights and humanitarian problems.

UNMIL’s peacekeeping operation in Liberia warrants a second-generation peacekeeping mission. Not only does the mandate stipulate humanitarian support, but it also specifies security reform and government building, which the UN sees as imperative to building peace. Moreover, the mandate states its intention “to assist the transitional government in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions…” (“UNMIL-Mandate”). The mandate calls for international collaboration to help with building workable government institutions in order to ensure effective rule-of-law for the Liberian people. In addition, the protection of these key government institutions--including ports, airports and other important infrastructures--is a main goal of the mandate (“UNMIL-Mandate”). Another important goal of UNMIL is to create a workable government adherent to the many ethnic factions of Liberia, given their understanding that the reason for the violence is ethnically motivated. Additionally, UNMIL understands the importance of ECOWAS and international partners in effectively helping the Liberian government implement the mandate.

The international composition of the peacekeeping force currently involves 63 countries contributing to military and police personnel (“Facts and Figures”). Additional forces include 506 international civilian personnel, 933 local staff and 245 UN Volunteers (“Facts and Figures”) The neutrality of the forces deployed from various states is important to note, given the climate of the modern international system. The United States and China, being respective powers within the international system, both contribute military and police personnel to UNMIL. Richard Boucher, a spokesman for the US Department of State, noted in a press statement that the United States, as of October 2003, had provided $26 million in contracted logistics support, including equipment to aid the peacekeeping role (1). Boucher also noted that the United States was sending nine officers, including military observers, to help in the operation (1). Additionally, two of the world’s largest powers, and a variety of other important international actors, including Germany and the United Kingdom, make up some of UNMIL’s forces. All of the international forces involved, including non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) continue to play an important role in the effective implementation of UNMIL’s mandate.



Works Cited

Adebajo, Adekeye. "Liberia: A Warlord's Peace." Ending Civil Wars : The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens. New York: Lynne Rienner, Incorporated, 2002. 601

Annan Kofi. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia. Rep.No. S/2003/875. Security Council, United Nations. 1-4. Liberia-UNMIL-UN Documents. 11 Sept. 2003. United Nations. 9 Oct. 2008 .

"Facts and Figures." United nations Peacekeeping. 2003. United Nations. 8 Oct. 2008 .

Resolution 1509 (2003). Rep.No. S/RES/1509 (2003). Security Council, United Nations. 2. 19Sept. 2003. United Nations. 9 Oct. 2008 .

"UNMIL-Background." United Nations Peacekeeping. 2005. United Nations. 8 Oct. 2008 .

"UNMIL-Mandate." United Nations Peacekeeping. 19 Sept. 2003. United Nations. 9 Oct. 2008 .

US Department of State. "UN Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia Begins Operations." Press release. 1 Oct. 2003. 10 Oct. 2008 .


CNN World News: President Bush Tours Liberia