Saturday, December 20, 2008

Preventive Action and the United Nations



The United Nations (UN) is an organization that operates under a complex international system based on sovereignty and territorial integrity. Consequently, establishing a world order without violating those international norms poses many difficulties for the UN. However, the responsibility of the UN to maintain peace through preventive action in the international system underlies an extensive partnership with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), regional organizations, such as the European Union and the African Union, and nation-states. Gareth Evans quotes in the chapter “Preventive Action and Conflict Resolution” in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century that “While there will continue to be a major, and growing, role for regional organizations…overwhelmingly the major responsibility for doing better [at preventive action] is going to have to be borne by the UN…” (87).


The UN has established itself as the center for conflict resolution, preventive action, and peacekeeping, which means the responsibility of regional organizations and NGOs in the area of preventive action must draw on the norms of the UN. When looking at the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), it is clear that, even though the UN takes major responsibility for establishing peace, the willingness of regional organizations and NGOs contributes greatly to this continued peace. However, the cohesive action seen with the regional organizations and NGOs is partly due to their adherence to UN regulations and guidelines. Consequently, the UN is the core organization for preventive action and peacekeeping in the international system, and therefore, it is responsible for improving peacekeeping methods thereafter.


The failure of collective security after WWI and the horrors experienced thereafter in WWII demonstrated the need for a core organization built on adherence to the protection of sovereignty and human rights. John Roper states the end of the Cold War “…has brought about a renaissance of the multilateral imperative, the desire to find multilateral solutions to problems of international relations and security” (Roper 255). The UN attributes itself as a non-coercive, neutral organization with limited military capability and a strong interposition force (Lecture 4). Nonetheless, since its establishment in 1945, the UN has been faced with many changes in the international system, most notably the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), causing the formation of a Unipolar international system.


This transcendence, with the atrocities of Bosnia/Herzegovina and Rwanda in the 1990s, has questioned the validity and effectiveness of the UN as a peacekeeping organization. However, the increasing importance of regional organizations and NGO’s and their willingness to step into conflicts has allowed the UN to overcome the many complex issues in the new international system. Evans notes that inevitably “Disputes themselves will continue to arise… and… they will do so with greater frequency and in more complex formulations, as the recent rapid growth of intrastate disputes suggests” (Evans 61). The change that came with the emergence of a Unipolar international system created an undesirable need for third-world states by the superpowers, since territorial claims and proxy wars meant little to the United States and Russia at the Cold War’s end.

In order to tackle this pervasive issue, the UN needs to commission a high volume of analytical study of major regions of the world where conflicts are prone to arise. The studies must focus on the geopolitical, ethnic, economic, and anthropological aspects of the state, while focusing on the possible UN strategies to addressing the problems. By understanding the reasons for violence and conflict, the UN can develop strategies addressing the specific issues and conflicts and can profligate a more rapid and efficient response.

Typically, the Secretary-General does not analyze a specific conflict until violence has reached impermissible levels and a peace-agreement has been brokered. This approach puts a time constraint on possible preventive action, which inadvertently limits the possibility of a strong and respectable peacekeeping force. Consequently, the security on the ground may be compromised, which Steven Stedman notes in Ending Civil Wars “…there cannot be…the holding of elections, reempowerment of civil society, establishment of political accountability, and redevelopment of the economy; many areas in which the UN must focus their analytical studies (Stedman 141). The abovementioned is an improvement that must be taken by the UN regardless of the economic cost to the organization because ultimately in doing so, the UN may be able to allocate resources more efficiently.

The need for improvement in preventive action from the UN increases as conflicts continue to arise throughout the world, most notably in Africa where conflicts in Central and West Africa continue to destabilize the region. The UN has to continue to adapt to changes in the international system and the conflicts that arise therein. The presence of spoilers in conflicts, and the complexities with curbing violence in a collapsed state have exacerbated the UN in the area of preventive action; however, regional organizations and NGOs have provided much support in these areas. NGOs in Liberia have been able to focus in areas such as education, health, safety, and the rebuilding of decimated villages, thus the possibilities of a stable and economically sustainable society increase.

Regional organizations such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) can provide numerous troops to the conflict area, help with logistics support for peacekeeping forces, and aid infrastructure building. The UN must take advantage of the many possibilities for effective deployment, as well as the collective action of states contributing to peacekeeping operations. However, the UN must also stay clear of relying heavily on outside organizations to provide this support. By making the many necessary improvements, the UN can provide a central guideline to outside organizations to substantiate the preventive action process. Fundamentally, it is through the UN that progress and improvement must be made, mostly for the reason that the UN is the center for conflict resolution after conflicts have not been resolved, and peacekeeping is commissioned. Evans notes that “…in a great many cases, disputes both can and should be satisfactorily managed and resolved without recourse to the UN, through cooperation at the bilateral, subregional, or regional level” (Evans 71).

UNMIL operations have sustained peace in Liberia since August 2003, and have been able to allow for the free election of President Sir-Leaf Johnson in 2005 (Security Council (2008) 11). Evans’ concluding quote in the instance of UNMIL operations is substantial given that ECOWAS was unable to sustain the subsequent peace agreement between the rival factions and the Liberian government. In this instance, the regional organization ECOWAS was unable to maintain peace in Liberia because of the complexity of the issues involved. The UN operates on a much higher international level than regional organizations and NGOs, and therefore, has a much greater base to support preventive action and peacekeeping operations. The operational capacity of ECOWAS forces in Liberia prior to UNMIL deployment was limited to urban regions, making smaller villages and areas more prone to corruption and violence. However, after UNMIL deployed its international peacekeeping force to the region, the smaller rural areas were subsequently protected by peacekeeping forces. The UN was able to establish funding from the international community and from financial organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

In conclusion, because the UN is the core organization for preventive action and peacekeeping, the responsibility for improving preventive action is an imperative. Evans’ quote merely attests to the immense responsibility that the UN has to the international community, and that by relying to heavily on regional organizations the UN hinders the possibility for correction within itself. By focusing on correction within the UN, preventive action may have a more firm effect in conflict-ridden areas, which may lead to a deterrence of violence. By commissioning a plethora of analytical studies of conflict regions and regions prone to conflict, the UN may be able to provide a more effective strategy to preventive action and peacekeeping implementation. This will help regional organizations to deter violence and conflict prior to UN operations, and will make preventive action more sustainable. The UN must also continue to adapt to the changes in the international system before problems arise that may deplete the UN’s respectability across the world. Furthermore, Evans’ conclusive quote makes an incisive point that preventive action must ultimately be honed and improved by the UN in order for peacekeeping to continue unabated

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

The United Nations Mission in Liberia: A Case Study

By Christopher Schmidt
Pages 1-4 of 12

The need for United Nations peacekeeping operations in Liberia came after several years of ethnic and political violence antagonized by President Samuel Doe’s government in the 1980s. The provocation of a failed 1985 coup attempt derives from Doe’s blatant agenda of ethnic exploitation, which limited most ethnic groups from government auspices. Subsequently, after several years of pervasive corruption and the slaughter of ethnic groups, the political state of Liberia led to social turbulence within these many ethnic factions. The eventual formation of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by American Liberian Charles Taylor, sought an anti-governmental agenda that set off the 1989-1997 civil war (Adebajo 601). With a civil war underway, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took an essential step by forming the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 (“UNMIL-Background”). ECOWAS was an essential organization during the beginning of the civil war, and well up to the 2003 deployment of UNMIL operations, because of their many programs aimed at solving the Liberian crisis. In 1993, the United Nations Security Council stepped into the conflict by establishing the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) (“UNMIL-Background”). UNOMIL completed its undertaking of aiding an eventual peace agreement on August 2, 1997, when the nation democratically elected Charles Taylor president under the new government establishment (“UNMIL-Background”).

With UNOMIL’s mandate complete, the UN established the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) in November 1997, aimed primarily at facilitating national reconciliation after the multiparty elections (Annan 1). Importantly, UNOL was backed by the Security Council, the United Nations country team, and well-known civil society organizations (Annan 1). Additionally, in the midst of UNOL’s peace-building efforts, the hindrance of their intended operations began with conflicts arising in government and political opposition parties. Two important rebel groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) emerged between 1999 and 2002 and aimed to overthrow President Taylor’s government, (Annan 2). In September 2002, the International Contact Group on Liberia was created in New York under the co-chairmanship of ECOWAS and the European Union in order to involve the international community (Annan 2). Subsequently, the Security Council pushed for the development of a strategy to address the problems in Liberia, and the threat it posed to international and regional peace and security (Annan 2).

After intense regional and international pressure, ECOWAS initiated peace talks on June 4, 2003 in Accra, Ghana, with the support of representatives of the United Nations, the African Union, the United States and the International Contact Group (Annan 3). Consequently, a ceasefire agreement was signed on June 17, 2003; however, LURD forces forcefully entered Monrovia and broke the peace agreement. In August 2003, President Taylor officially handed over power to Vice-President Moses Blah, and peace talks in Accra between the two rebel parties began. With the help of representatives from international and regional entities, the peace negotiations eventually led to an agreement. This agreement stipulated the end to the war and the creation of the National Transitional Government of Liberia. The two rebel parties requested under the peace agreement, and in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, that the United Nations deploy a force to Liberia to help support the National Transitional Government (Annan 4). Following international pressure, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1497 on August 1, 2003, allowing the establishment of a multinational force and a United Nations stabilization force in Liberia. After further United Nations evaluation of the situation, the adoption of Resolution 1509 on September 19, 2003 created the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (Annan 16). Additionally, under request of the Secretary-General, UNOL was to terminate its offices and transfer its functions to UNMIL (Resolution 1509 (2003) 2).

The mandate, likewise, addresses a multitude of humanitarian, military, and financial issues, as well as the implementation of various agreements between the rival parties (“UNMIL-Mandate”). More importantly, the mandate demands the “support for implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the protection of UN staff, facilities and civilians, the support for humanitarian and human rights assistance, the support for security reform, and the support for implementation of the peace process” (“UNMIL-Mandate”).” The aforementioned covers a comprehensive strategy of how to address the many issues in Liberia while clarifying the intentions of UNMIL and all international entities involved. Additionally, while considering the history of the conflict, and the problems involved therein, the mandate explains the necessity for humanitarian and human rights assistance, and infrastructure building. For example, the mandate states UNMIL’s responsibility to “help establish the necessary security conditions for humanitarian assistance…to assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia…” (“UNMIL-Mandate”). This demonstrates the mandates intention for protecting the humanitarian aid going through Liberia, which will help control the growing human rights and humanitarian problems.

UNMIL’s peacekeeping operation in Liberia warrants a second-generation peacekeeping mission. Not only does the mandate stipulate humanitarian support, but it also specifies security reform and government building, which the UN sees as imperative to building peace. Moreover, the mandate states its intention “to assist the transitional government in conjunction with ECOWAS and other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions…” (“UNMIL-Mandate”). The mandate calls for international collaboration to help with building workable government institutions in order to ensure effective rule-of-law for the Liberian people. In addition, the protection of these key government institutions--including ports, airports and other important infrastructures--is a main goal of the mandate (“UNMIL-Mandate”). Another important goal of UNMIL is to create a workable government adherent to the many ethnic factions of Liberia, given their understanding that the reason for the violence is ethnically motivated. Additionally, UNMIL understands the importance of ECOWAS and international partners in effectively helping the Liberian government implement the mandate.

The international composition of the peacekeeping force currently involves 63 countries contributing to military and police personnel (“Facts and Figures”). Additional forces include 506 international civilian personnel, 933 local staff and 245 UN Volunteers (“Facts and Figures”) The neutrality of the forces deployed from various states is important to note, given the climate of the modern international system. The United States and China, being respective powers within the international system, both contribute military and police personnel to UNMIL. Richard Boucher, a spokesman for the US Department of State, noted in a press statement that the United States, as of October 2003, had provided $26 million in contracted logistics support, including equipment to aid the peacekeeping role (1). Boucher also noted that the United States was sending nine officers, including military observers, to help in the operation (1). Additionally, two of the world’s largest powers, and a variety of other important international actors, including Germany and the United Kingdom, make up some of UNMIL’s forces. All of the international forces involved, including non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) continue to play an important role in the effective implementation of UNMIL’s mandate.



Works Cited

Adebajo, Adekeye. "Liberia: A Warlord's Peace." Ending Civil Wars : The Implementation of Peace Agreements. Ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens. New York: Lynne Rienner, Incorporated, 2002. 601

Annan Kofi. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Liberia. Rep.No. S/2003/875. Security Council, United Nations. 1-4. Liberia-UNMIL-UN Documents. 11 Sept. 2003. United Nations. 9 Oct. 2008 .

"Facts and Figures." United nations Peacekeeping. 2003. United Nations. 8 Oct. 2008 .

Resolution 1509 (2003). Rep.No. S/RES/1509 (2003). Security Council, United Nations. 2. 19Sept. 2003. United Nations. 9 Oct. 2008 .

"UNMIL-Background." United Nations Peacekeeping. 2005. United Nations. 8 Oct. 2008 .

"UNMIL-Mandate." United Nations Peacekeeping. 19 Sept. 2003. United Nations. 9 Oct. 2008 .

US Department of State. "UN Peacekeeping Mission in Liberia Begins Operations." Press release. 1 Oct. 2003. 10 Oct. 2008 .


CNN World News: President Bush Tours Liberia

Thursday, September 4, 2008

Anbar Province Handover


Monday, September 1, 2008, American troops handed over the Anbar Province to Iraqi forces, leaving security responsibilities to the Iraqi people. This is a major step to American forces stabilizing all 18 Iraqi provinces, and deserves unmitigated international attention. However, media outlets have not quite picked up the significance. The Anbar Province was the birthplace of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and a major hot zone for American troops. The handover signifies the breakdown of al-Qaeda’s once dominant presence in that region and sends many positive messages to the Iraqi people.

When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, it was made clear to the entire international community that Iraq was a serious threat to the world. Allegations that Saddam Hussein was harboring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) gave the United States enough “just cause” to pursue invasion, even though the United Nations did not approve. However, five years later it was clear that these allegations were false and held little truth, proving the “just cause” illegitimate. The invasion weakened Iraq, and the US made it clear it would see to refurbish the Iraqi government into a strong, economically prosperous sate, which I still support. The American media and criticism of the war has made it difficult for me to obtain an objective understanding of the problems and successes in Iraq.

I watched a documentary on HBO a month ago called “Baghdad High,” and realized how important it is for the US to continue battling insurgents. The Anbar Province proves that the once powerless people of Iraq are gaining more control of their country. The American presence, no matter how contested, must continue their goals in order to ensure the Iraqi citizens are able to combat sectarian violence and insurgents coming in from Iran and Syria. The US Military needs to pressure the Iraqi people into taking control and utilizing their newly gained constitutional rights once denied them by Saddam Hussein. I have a huge desire to go to Iraq and see for myself the disasters and the successes of the US’ invasion, because amidst all the politics and the unfair media, I feel this is the only way I will know.

I have a link that will take you directly to an HBO website, which contains more information on “Baghdad High.” The picture above is from the website and a scene from the movie.

http://www.hbo.com/docs/docuseries/baghdadhigh/

Anbar Province