The conclusions to my central arguments against or for the emergence of a cosmopolitan conception of human worth in a post-WWII international system have several weaknesses and challenges. I concluded that the international system has moved progressively towards universal legalism, yet I asserted that regardless of these changes, the DRC case cannot support the ongoing efforts of the UN to unify states towards an enforceable human rights regime. Additionally, my argument limited its focus to domestic turbulence in the DRC to explain the condition of the international system. Domestic relations cannot necessarily provide an explanation for the entire international system. It is necessary then to provide a cross-cutting analysis to redeem the aforementioned research from its circular assumptions.
One aspect of my thesis evaluated MONUC’s peacekeeping mission to offer a more realistic analysis of the UN’s ability to defend the human rights regime and thus, I concluded that UN peacekeeping is a defunct agency in global society. However, such a conclusion based on one of many UN missions cannot possibly provide an overarching explanation of the modern international system as it disregards any possible presentation of other UN missions and therefore, it cannot be tested adequately. Thus, the following text will focus on UN peacekeeping in two different cases: UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) from 1992 to 1994 with special emphasis on the US’ role, and the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 1993 to the months following the genocide. These UN missions will be compared with the current and largest UN mission in the world, MONUC. These analyses aim to be short and concise, conveying important information on their original mandate and future mandates.
Cosmopolitanism and realism, as stated previously, are contending conceptions in international relations theory. By examining previous peacekeeping cases, I will attempt to offer a more solid and conclusive conception of the international community. When it comes to cosmopolitanism and its substantiation, on a smaller level, it can be seen from any UN peacekeeping operation given the nature of such missions: to provide universal equality regardless of nationality, and to secure international peace as well as security and the rights of those individuals regardless of national interest gains.
Realism would contend that UN peacekeeping is a defunct and overly idealistic system that can only be achieved if states feel a national interest is present and attainable. Therefore, I am presenting two cases in UN peacekeeping, along with the critical information provided by MONUC’s operations, to give a less circular reasoning in my analysis. Evidence of each view will be presented in each case to support such claims. Importantly, the history of peacekeeping has demonstrated several missions that have either been deemed a failure or a success, depending largely on the willingness of the international community to contribute to these missions.
Additionally, peacekeeping is challenged by the improbability of having universal implementation methods as cases differ do to culture and geography. The first UN peacekeeping mission was the United Nations Emergency Force – I (UNEF I), in response to Israeli, French, and British hostilities on the Egyptian border.109 At this point in time, peacekeeping was limited in its military capabilities, and the peacekeeping mission was strictly neutral, and non-coercive.110 Yet, these methods have proven complicated and often impossible during the many intrastate wars of the 1990s. Therefore, the following cases may provide a better understanding of the evolution of peacekeeping and further explain the contention between cosmopolitanism and realism.
Somalia: One of Many in a New World Order
It is no question that all UN peacekeeping operations responded to severe and devastating humanitarian strife, collateral damage, and relentless warring factions aimed at securing power over the state. Somalia was no exception as the civil war that began in 1991 killed an estimated 50,000 “non-combatants” and destroyed any remnants of a functioning society.111 The original mandate lacked sufficient stipulations to aid an increasingly volatile situation, mostly based off reports from the Secretary General. The mandate was concise and persistent in its calls for an international humanitarian response.
It called for increased airlift operations to deliver humanitarian aid to an isolated Mogadishu. Additionally, it established four zonal headquarters for the operation, urged logistical support and reiterated the need for an international recognition of the humanitarian situation.112 Eventually, after several humanitarian aid efforts on behalf of the US (Operation Provide Relief, which airlifted 28,000 tons of aid) and other states, UN peacekeeping took a coercive shift in the approval of Security Council Resolution 794 in December 2003, and granted the deployment of all necessary means to establish security and humanitarian relief operations.113 The US created and led the United Task Force (UNITAF), which was supported by nearly 28,000 American troops and 10,000 from other states.114
Although Operation Restore Hope was a wake-up call to uneasy Americans that had witnessed a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu after the infamous Black Hawk Down incident, the mission itself was successful. Robert DiPrizio wrote that the operation commanded five months and achieved all of the four phases laid out (the fourth stage being the handover of operations to the UN) and the UNITAF’s casualties were low, at 27 total (18 Americans). The mission’s success prompted the UN to strengthen the original mandate to ensure that a recurrence of violence did not happen. Nonetheless, given the Somalia case, it is clear that a militarily robust UN mission, although paradoxical, can achieve quick results.
UN peacekeeping operations had progressed substantially in the post-Cold War international system, yet with the remaining decade ahead, more tests of the capacity of UN peacekeeping to end violence would arise and question the effectiveness of its operation. Notwithstanding, it was apparent that US intervention was necessary and what is the perfect example of cosmopolitan ethics. However, the realism existed in the withdrawal of most US troops after the Black Hawk Down incident, which may have been a product of US domestic reaction to the 18 American lives lost in the battle. Despite the fact that hundreds of Somalis died in the fighting, and several more innocent lives had already been lost before and during the UN’s mission, the United states ended its support after recognizing the mission was a failure and also to appease US Congressional backlash at the mission. Sadly, this abstention would continue through the 1990s, even in the face of genocide.
The Genocide in Rwanda: Back to Square One
The Rwanda case reveals a troubling and dark period in post-WWII history. The reuse of genocide as a form of war was something the UN was created to prevent. However, UNAMIR witnessed the worst nonintervention in the international community, stemming directly from great power abstention and appeals to withdraw the UN mission in Rwanda. UNAMIR’s mandate was severely inefficient before the genocide. The mandate was first meant to facilitate the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement between the rebel Tutsi and Hutus, to monitor the ceasefire between the warring parties, and to assist in humanitarian aid.115 In April 1994, the Security Council passed a resolution to give the mission intermediary power and continue aid efforts that had been cut off as the genocide was underway.
Essentially, the mandate emulated the weak peacekeeping methods evident during the UNEF I operation, and had no semblance of a robust mandate as seen in the Somali case. Samantha Power notes that US “intelligence analysts were keenly aware of Rwanda’s history and the possibility that atrocity would occur [and]... a CIA study found that some four million tons of small arms had been transferred from Poland to Rwanda, via Belgium,” clearly as tools for the genocide.116 The warning signs were there, but what kept the United States from intervening on a scale witnessed in Somalia? Furthermore, why did the United States and other Security Council members deny UNAMIR more troops and instead reduced it from almost 5,000 before the genocide to nearly 300 during the genocide?
During the genocide, in which the Hutu majority was butchering the “cockroach” Tutsi minority, UN officials reported that within days of its start, 50,000 Tutsis had been butchered in the streets, churches, schools and government agencies, and within a few months, nearly 800,000 were dead.117 As stated before, Rwanda witnessed the worst in the international community, the United Nations and the free world. US and UN bureaucracy cost nearly one million lives. What does this mean for cosmopolitan ethics and realism? Firstly, US abstention from intervention in Rwanda may stem from the negative political impact of the 18 dead US troops in Somalia. It would appear that although the US expressed humanitarianism during the Somalia case and basked in its superpower leadership in the ‘New World Order,’ political backlash during the Somalia case caused the United States to rethink its foreign policy in humanitarian interventions. UN peacekeeping could not enjoy the willingness of states to stop violence as seen in Somalia, and state interests would once more impede on progress in the human rights regime.
Conclusions:
What do these two cases in UN peacekeeping mean for MONUC? MONUC at first was a substantially week mission, severely undermined by the Secretary-General at the time and the mandate took years to reach an adequate level. Although MONUC still lacks enforcement power, UN forces have been aiding the transitional government in purging the DRC of rebel factions crossing national borders to pillage resources, rape women, destroy villages, and steal children to enhance their campaigns.
The UN Security Council has never failed the DRC because it has persistently adapted the several issues hampering the mandates proper implementation and the success of the transitional government. However, it is not the actions of the UN that should be condoned, but rather, the lack of timing in passing and implementing these changes. It is no mistake that the majority of people, regardless of nationality, do not know of how severe the situation in the DRC has been for more than 10 years. Yet, realistically, amidst the emergence of coercive peacekeeping in the Somalia case or “armed humanitarians” according to Robert DiPrizio, and what was later seen in Kosovo, there has been a positive cosmopolitan movement in peacekeeping.
The phenomenon of UN peacekeeping, as evidenced by Somalia, Rwanda and the DRC, has had several weaknesses. Rwanda was a failure and the genocide occurred because there was an international community of the unwilling, yet when willing international actors are involved, most importantly the United States, UN peacekeeping is at its strongest and missions are more likely to succeed. The DRC case is interesting because although it receives more than $1 billion in international aid and the largest UN peacekeeping force in the world, the darkness of the situation there is the absence of international awareness.
Nonetheless, the DRC case, although a failure in many respects, substantiates a cosmopolitan shift in international politics because it utilized the evolutionary peacekeeping seen in Somalia i.e. a shift in mandate strength. The human rights regime has provided a viable alternative to collective security, which was mostly a failure in the League of Nations system. The darkness does not lie in the international community as a whole, but within abstention from intervention. The DRC is the beneficiary of US efforts (AFRICOM), UN efforts, and efforts by international organizations, but not of a wide-scale military operation as seen in Somalia. I will say lastly that the darkness lies also in ignorance, a contagious reality for the DRC.
